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**THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY**

**OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION**

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**Citizenship:** U.S.

**DOCTORAL STUDIES**

The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.

Ph.D., Economics

DISSERTATION TITLE: "Issues in the Industrial Organization of Health Markets."

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: May 2011.

**ADVISORS AND REFERENCES**

Professor Dan Levin  
(Principal Advisor)  
OSU Economics Department  
410 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High St.  
Columbus, OH 43210  
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Professor Paul J. Healy  
OSU Economics Department  
410 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High St.  
Columbus, OH 43210  
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Professor Matt Lewis  
OSU Economics Department  
410 Arps Hall, 1945 N. High St.  
Columbus, OH 43210  
614-292-0480  
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**PRE-DOCTORAL EDUCATION**

M.A., Economics  
B.S., Mathematics (*Graduated with Distinction*)

New York University, 2006  
University of Victoria, 1998

**RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS**

Primary fields: Industrial Organization, Health Economics, Applied Theory.  
Secondary fields: Empirical Microeconomics.

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Instructor, Issues in the U.S. Economy (undergraduate) at OSU.	Winter 2009
Instructor, Money and Banking (undergraduate) at OSU.	Autumn 2008
Instructor, Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate) at OSU.	Summer 2008
Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate) at OSU.	Spring 2008
Teaching Assistant, Money and Banking (undergraduate) at OSU.	Winter 2008
Teaching Assistant, Money and Banking (undergraduate) at OSU.	Autumn 2007
Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate) at NYU.	Autumn 2005

**RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

<b>Experimental Economics Lab, OSU</b> Research Assistant to Prof. Paul J. Healy. -Conducted economics experiments related to various projects.	Spring 09 - Present
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**HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS**

Department Citation for Excellence in Teaching, Ohio State University.	2009
University Fellowship, Ohio State University.	2006-2007

**FUNDED RESEARCH**

The Graduate School's Alumni Grants for Graduate Research and Scholarship	2010
Project: "Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks"	\$2,000

**RESEARCH PAPERS****"Regulating a Monopolist with Unverifiable Quality."**

The existing mechanism design literature on regulation treats quantity and quality as interchangeable. I explicitly model the inseparability of quality and quantity and show that the optimal regulatory policy may generate a different outcome than has been previously suggested. Specifically, I analyze the optimal regulatory policies for a monopolist with superior knowledge of either cost or demand where demand is affected by unverifiable quality. Many markets possessing unverifiable quality often contain a mix of for-profit and not-for profit firms (e.g., health services, insurance, and education), therefore the firm's objective is modeled as a combination of profit- and output-maximization. The firm's ability to manipulate demand by adjusting quality can result in an under- or over-supply relative to the first-best level, even for a pure profit-maximizer. A firm's informational advantage may be completely attenuated, however, when the firm is a pure output-maximizer and the regulator removes the demand response to price by paying directly for the good. The findings provide new insights into how the strategic response of the firm and consumers to the regulator's payment policy may lead to market distortions and what form these distortions take.

**"Utilizing Free Samples in the Prescription Drug Market."**

I develop a theoretical model of pharmaceutical sampling to provide insight into the strategic use and welfare effects of free drug samples. Consumers have a heterogeneous degree of illness and consumer-to-drug matches are idiosyncratic. A firm dispenses samples to mitigate the consumers risk, which increases profit by expanding the market and/or allowing it to set a higher price. I find that the firms sampling strategy varies with the state of information. When the efficacy of the drug is commonly known the firms sampling decision is not monotonic in the efficacy. When the efficacy is not commonly known, however, the sampling decision acts as a signal of the efficacy and is monotonic. Moreover, because of the signaling effect, the firm dispenses samples for lower efficacies than is optimal when information is symmetric. The effect on consumer surplus is dependent on the welfare gains generated by the market-expansion effect of sampling.

**"Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks"**

*with Matthew Lewis*

We examine the effect of hospital system membership on the bargaining outcome between a hospital and a managed care organization (MCO). Previous research has documented that system hospitals receive a higher payment than non-system hospitals from MCOs. However it is unclear if this difference occurs because system membership strengthens a hospitals bargaining position, because system membership enhances the value of a hospital to patients, or because of some combination of these two effects. We use data from California to determine the cause of the higher payment by decomposing the effect of system membership into value-added and bargaining-power effects. We find that market power in a local patient market is associated with a substantially higher bargaining power. In contrast we find little evidence that the number of markets or total size of a system is associated with an increase in bargaining power. The hospitals physician arrangements, and other characteristics can also have a significant effect on the bargaining power of a hospital. On the demand-side, system membership is valued more by consumers for national and cross-state hospital chains that extend out of state but not local systems.

**WORKS IN PROGRESS**

**“Physician Treatment Incentives: Insurance Versus Managed Care”**

**“Procurement with Producer Cost Uncertainty”**

**PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES**

Reviewer: China Economic Review  
Conferences: 2010 International Industrial Organization Conference (Selected Paper), University of British Columbia, May 2010.  
Invited Seminars: Kent State University, Sept. 24, 2010.  
Bowling Green State University, Oct. 22, 2010.

**PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE**

<b>Booz Allen Hamilton</b>	01/2006 - 09/2006
Senior Consultant	Dayton, OH
<b>Strategic Analysis, Inc.</b>	07/2000 - 12/2005
Software Engineer	Dayton, OH
<b>Good Samaritan Hospital</b>	01/1999 - 12/1999
Network Associate	Dayton, OH

**OTHER INFORMATION**

**Professional Affiliations:** American Economic Association, Industrial Organization Society.  
**Computer/Programming Skills:** SAS, Stata, LaTeX, Ztree, Java/J2EE, VBScript/ASP, Javascript.  
**Database Development:** SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle 9i/10g.  
**Languages:** English (native), Spanish (beginner).